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Beginning in 2000, Japan’s government-owned postal saving system experienced a rapid outflow 
of funds as a large number of 10-year fixed-rate Postal Saving Certificates (PSCs) that had been 
purchased during the period of high interest rates in the early 1990s were maturing. This paper 
exploits this episode as a natural experiment to investigate the crowding-out effects of a 
government-owned depository institution on local economies. The panel data of 47 prefectures 
from 1995 to 2004 show that the prefectures where local funds were heavily invested in the 
postal saving system in the early 1990s tended to experience a larger shift of funds into private 
banks from the postal saving system in the early 2000s, suggesting that the exogenous maturing 
of PSCs was in part responsible for the observed shifts in the allocation of local funds. More 
importantly, the (instrumented) flow of local funds to private banks from the postal saving 
system has statistically robust and economically important positive effects on local output and on 
the number of small firms, but not on the number of large firms. These results provide empirical 
support for the view that a government-owned depository institution has crowding-out effects on 
local economies and, in particular, on small firms that rely on local banks in direct competition 
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1. Introduction 
Do government-owned banks serve under-banked (or un-banked) savers who do not have access 
to the private provision of depository services, thereby raising untapped saving that would not 
otherwise have flowed into financial markets? Alternatively, does the presence of government-
owned banks retard the growth of private banks and economies as they absorb funds that could 
be deployed more productively? These questions are of interest to policy-makers as a number of 
studies suggest that the development of financial markets is an important determinant of 
entrepreneurship and economic growth (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Nonetheless, because the allocation of deposits between government-owned banks and private 
banks is endogenous to local financial and economic conditions, it is difficult to formulate 
appropriate empirical strategy to investigate these questions in a systematic fashion. This paper 
studies whether or not a government-owned depository institution has negative crowding-out 
effects on local economies by exploiting a unique event in Japan that resulted in a transparent 
instrumental variable that can be used to identify exogenous shift in the allocation of local funds 
between a government-owned depository institution and private banks.  
In 1990, interest rates peaked, causing many Japanese savers to purchase Postal Saving 
Certificates (PSCs) issued by the local postal offices. PSCs resemble 10-year fixed-rate 
certificates of deposits (CDs) offered by private banks: PSCs offer virtually identical interest 
rates as CDs and, like CDs, are also protected by government guarantee up to 10,000,000 yen 
(approximately, 100,000 dollars).
1 The only difference, however, is that the holders of PSCs do 
not have to pay a penalty for early liquidation. Such an implicit “put option” gives depositors 
                                                 
1 One could argue, however, that PSCs might be a little safer if depositors believe that (1) the postal saving system 
will never default, and (2) private banks fail with a positive probability and the actual payout of guaranteed deposits 
will cost them some time and resources (e.g., bureaucratic paper works to verify which accounts belong to who).   3
strong incentives to hold on to PSCs during the periods of declining interest rates until maturity 
while liquidating and re-investing them during the periods of rising interest rates.  
After 1990, Japanese savers faced steadily declining interest rates, which eventually fell 
to zero percent in 2000. Predictably, because of this extraordinary development, those who had 
bought PSCs in the early 1990s held onto them throughout the 1990s. These PSCs began to reach 
maturity in 2000, prompting those savers to invest their funds elsewhere as newly issued PSCs 
no longer offered attractive interest rates. Although some of these funds were re-deposited into 
the postal saving system, the system, which had held 260 trillion yen as of 1999, ended up losing 
about one-fifth of its funds (i.e., 60 trillion yen) by 2005. Given that Japan’s GDP is 
approximately 500 trillion yen, the size of financial re-balancing that occurred after 2000 is 
significant. In sum, this unique institutional feature of PSCs, although it created serious 
distortion in the societal allocation of interest rate risk, generated a useful natural experiment in 
which a large sum of local funds that were taken in by the postal saving system in the early 
1990s were being released to seek the highest return 10 years later for reasons unrelated to local 
demand conditions. 
More specifically, I make use of variation in the share of postal saving deposits in total 
deposits (i.e., postal saving deposits plus deposits at private banks) across 47 prefectures during 
the period of high interest rates in the early 1990s as an instrument to predict variation in 
differential shifts in the share 10 years later in the early 2000. The empirical results indeed show 
that the prefecture with a higher share of postal saving deposits in the 1990s tended to experience 
larger decline in the share after 2000. That is, the prefectures whose funds were more heavily 
invested in the postal saving system in the early 1990s tended to experience larger outflow of 
deposits from the postal saving system into private banks in the early 2000s as a result of the   4
exogenous maturing of PSCs. Furthermore, the share of postal saving deposits, when 
appropriately instrumented, is negatively correlated with prefecture income and also with the 
number of small firms, but not the number of large firms. Overall, the findings lend support for 
the view that Japan’s postal saving system had a negative crowding-out effect on local economy 
as it took away scarce funds from private banks. In addition, the results suggest that such 
crowding-out effects have distributional consequence as they have the largest effects on small 
firms that rely on local banks that compete with the postal saving system for deposits. 
This paper is closely related to a large literature that studies the adverse effects of 
government-ownership of banks on the efficiency of credit allocation and economic performance 
(e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Dinç, 2005; Micco, Panizza, and Yanez, 2007; Cole, forthcoming; Imai, forthcoming). The 
empirical evidence in this literature suggests that the negative economic effects of government-
owned banks stem from the fact that they are prone to make lending decisions based upon 
political considerations, not on the economic viability of investment opportunities. This paper 
complements these earlier studies by examining the funding side of a government owned 
depository institution and estimating the economic costs that are associated with flow of funds 
from private banking sector to a government owned depository institution. 
The present paper also complements a growing literature on access to financial services 
around the world (e.g., World Bank, 2008; Schmukler, Gozzi, and de la Torre, 2007; Claessens, 
2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007). Strikingly, the existing cross-country 
studies in this literature show that government-ownership of banks, most of which are supposed 
to provide universal financial services, is negatively correlated with various indices of access to 
finance (e.g., Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007). Although these results need to   5
be interpreted with caution given the endogeneity of government owned banks, one 
interpretation that is consistent with both the results of cross-country studies and those of this 
paper is that large government-owned banks, like Japan’s postal saving system, expends an 
enormous amount of resources in its efforts to draw deposits away from private banks instead of 
offering depository services to the un-banked (or under-banked). This interpretation is also 
consistent with the political motivation of governments to extract a large sum of economic rents 
from financial markets at the expense of public interests.  
In addition, this paper’s findings closely resemble those of O’Hara and Easley (1979) that 
show that the postal saving system in the United States diverted substantial sums from thrift 
institutions during the period of the Great Depression which, in turn, caused a severe slump in 
local housing markets. A policy implication that naturally emerges from both this paper and 
O’Hara and Easley (1979) is that postal saving systems -or government-owned financial 
institutions in general- that aim to provide financial services to the un-banked or under-banked 
must be carefully designed so as not to adversely affect the flow of funds to local borrowers who 
borrow from financial institutions that are in direct competition with postal saving systems for 
deposits. 
Finally, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) show that local financial development 
contributes positively to entrepreneurship and local economic growth in Italy where, presumably, 
there have been no regulatory barriers to intra-national flow of capital for more than a century. 
Based on these results, they maintain that “domestic financial institutions are likely to remain 
important in a financially integrated Europe and, more broadly, in a financially integrated world   6
for some time to come.”
2 The results of the present paper are also consistent with such view: the 
allocation of local deposits between the postal saving system and private banks turns out to be an 
important determinant of local income and entrepreneurships in Japan where there is no barrier 
to intra-national capital mobility. That is, if there was no informational friction in Japan’s 
financial market, local economic performance would not depend on the supply condition of local 
deposits since profitable investment projects would have attracted finance from national (or 
international) capital market. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of Japan’s postal saving system (Postal Saving Certificates, in particular) during the 
period that the present paper investigates. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. 
Section 4 presents the basic results. Section 5 shows the results on differential effects of finance 





Japan’s postal saving system is large. There are over 24,000 post offices nationwide, more than 
the total number of bank branches (just over 22,000). As of 1999, when its deposits peaked, the 
amount of outstanding deposits was 260 trillion yen (approximately $2.4 trillion), 37 percent of 
total household deposit holdings, more than a half of Japan’s Gross Domestic Products). The 
funds collected at post offices were channeled to the Ministry of Finance, which generally used 
                                                 
2 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Becker (2007) also show the importance of local financial condition for local 
income and entrepreneurship in the US. Their results, however, might be driven by incomplete branch deregulation 
that left the US financial market geographically segmented. 
3 The postal saving system went through extensive reform in 2007. This section focuses exclusively on the 
institutional background of postal saving system during 1985-2004.   7
them to fund central and local government and government-owned enterprises and banks.
4 Hence, 
locally collected funds were not necessarily invested in local economies. 
  Among the type of deposits offered at post offices, Postal Saving Certificates (PSCs) 
were the most popular, equaling as much as 90 percent of total deposits collected by postal 
saving system. PSCs closely resembled 10-year fixed-rate certificates of deposits (CDs) issued 
by private banks: PSCs offered virtually identical interest rates as CDs, and, like CDs, were 
protected by government guarantee up to 10,000,000 yen (approximately $100,000). The main 
attractions of PSCs were: (1) they offered a fixed-interest rate for up to 10 years maturity, so that 
savers did not bear any interest rate risk; and (2) early withdrawal could be made without penalty 
after six months.
5  Such an implicit “put option” naturally gave depositors strong incentives to 
hold onto PSCs during the period of declining interest rates until maturity while liquidating them 
during the period of rising interest rates. 
Hence, if the interest rate on PSCs peaks and then never recovers to that level during the 
subsequent 10 years, then the  postal saving system will be vulnerable to fund withdrawal exactly 
10 years after the peak year, provided that the postal saving system is unable to offer a 
competitive interest rate in order to prevent deposit withdrawal. The Japanese economy has twice 
experienced such movement in interest rates as can be seen in Figure 1. The first such episode 
occurred in the 1980s. As the interest rate on PSCs rose prior to 1980, depositors exercised their 
“put option” by liquidating their PSCs and then purchasing them back at higher interest rates, 
which can be seen by the simultaneous rise in “receipts” and “withdrawals” of funds in and out 
of postal saving system prior to 1980. Over the next 10 years, the interest rate never recovered to 
                                                 
4 Recent empirical studies suggest that these funds were allocated based on political purposes and invested in 
unviable projects (Doi and Hoshi (2003), Imai (forthcoming)). 
5 Private banks in Japan were offering so-called Maturity Designated Time Deposits (MTDs), which gave the same 
type of implicit option, but the maturity of MTDs was only three years.   8
the 1980 level, which meant that the postal saving system was vulnerable to a loss of deposits in 
1990. As Figure 1 shows, however, although the postal saving system did experience rapid 
withdrawals of funds in 1990, virtually all of these funds were re-deposited back into it, resulting 
in no significant net loss of deposits. The key to understanding this phenomenon is that the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication led an aggressive political campaign with the Ministry 
of Finance in order to retain these deposits by offering competitive interest rates in 1990, which 
can be seen in the shrinking difference between the interest rate on PSCs and that on 10-year 
Japanese Government Bonds. 
The interest rate peaked again in 1990 and did not recover to this level for more than a 
decade, leaving the postal saving system vulnerable to a loss of deposits in 2000. This episode 
was similar to the events of 1980-90 except that the interest rates dropped to extremely low 
levels as PSCs were maturing in 2000 and the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications was not 
allowed to offer competitive interest to retain funds in the postal saving system.
6 Predictably, 
even though most PSCs were rolled over, the postal saving system lost a large sum of funds -
approximately 60 trillion yen, or 23 percent of its total funds- starting in 2000.  
 
3. Empirical Strategy and Data 
The above discussion suggests that the allocation of local funds between the postal saving system 
and private banks in the early 2000 is in part driven by the inevitable maturing of PSCs that were 
purchased during the early 1990s. That is, the differential decline in the share of postal saving 
deposits in the early 2000 across 47 prefectures should be related to how heavily local funds 
                                                 
6 This is because the privatization/shrinkage of postal saving system and government-affiliated financial institutions 
were given serious political consideration in the Diet. See Imai (forthcoming) for the political background 
surrounding the postal saving privatization in Japan.   9
were invested in the postal saving system as of the early 1990s. Hence, the basic specification for 
the first stage regression is: 
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 2000-04)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (1) 
 
where Postal Saving is the ratio of postal saving deposits to total deposits, and Dummy for 2000-
04 is a dummy variable that equals 1 during 2000-04. The regression equation includes 
prefecture fixed effects and year fixed effects, βi and βt, which capture the unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of each prefecture and economic-wide shocks that affect the allocation 
of local funds. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of error 
terms within each prefecture (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).
7  A coefficient β1 on 
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Postal Saving)it-10 captures differential shifts in the share of postal saving 
deposits that occurred starting in 2000. If β1 is negative, then it means that those prefectures 
where local funds were more heavily invested in postal saving system relative to private banks in 
the early 1990s (i.e., the prefectures with high (Postal Saving)it-10) tended to experience a larger 
shift of funds from postal saving system to private banks (i.e., a larger decline in Postal Savingit) 
beginning in 2000 as a result of the maturing of these deposits. 
The second stage regression equation is simply: 
 
Incomeit = γi + γt + γ1Postal Savingit + εit      (2) 
 
                                                 
7 Stata’s robust and cluster options are used to compute standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
serially correlation in error term.   10
where Income is the log of Gross Prefecture Product per capita. As in the first stage regression, 
this equation includes prefecture fixed effects and year fixed effects, γi and γt, which capture the 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics of each prefecture and economic-wide shocks that 
affect local economic activities.
8 A system of these two equations is estimated with Two Stage 
Least Squares (TSLS) using the data that cover 47 prefectures in Japan over a decade from 1995 
to 2004.
9 The crucial identifying assumption in this framework is that the share of postal saving 
deposits in total deposits in the early 1990s in each prefecture does not contain any information 
that predicts economic performance 10 years later. Data sources are described in Table A.2. 
Table A.3 provides summary statistics. 
 
4. Basic Results 
Table 1 shows the basic results. Column 1 reports the results of simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. The coefficient on Postal Saving is negative and significant, but there is no 
causal interpretation to this coefficient given the endogeneity of the allocation of deposits 
between private banks and the postal saving system. Column 2 shows the results of the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation in which (Dummy for 2000-04)*(Postal Saving, t-10) is 
used as an instrument to extract the exogenous component of Postal Saving. The results of the 
first stage regressions are consistent with the prior expectation. The coefficient on (Dummy for 
2000-04)*(Postal Saving, t-10) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that those 
prefectures with large amount of postal saving deposits in the early 1990 experienced a larger 
shifts of funds from the postal saving system to private banks in the early 2000 due to the 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, the panel data can be collapsed into a simple cross-sectional data to estimate the parameter of 
interest γ1. The discussion and results of this approach are given in Appendix. 
9 Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of error terms within each prefecture (i.e., 
I use Stata’s TSLS with Stata’s xtivreg2 command (Schaffer, 2007) with.robust and cluster options (Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan, 2004).    11
maturing of PSCs. The first stage F-statistic is large, suggesting that the instrument is strong 
(Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
In the second stage regression, the coefficient on Postal Saving is negative and 
statistically significant. The results are economically important as well. They suggest that a 3 
percentage point increase in the share of postal saving deposits, a typical change within 
prefecture over time (Table A.2), leads to roughly a 3 percent increase in local income. Overall, 
the results seem to confirm that the postal saving system had crowding-out effects on local 
economic activity. 
However, one might wonder if the share of postal saving deposits in the early 1990s 
contains some information about future economic condition, thereby making these results 
spurious. That is, the instrumental variable may in fact be invalid. To address this concern, I 
perform three falsification exercises. First, I eliminate the period of treatment (2000-2004) from 
the data and check whether the share of postal saving deposits in the early 1990s has predictive 
power for the differential shifts in this share in the late 1990s, a few years before the treatment 
was in effect. In other words, I apply a fictitious treatment starting in 1997, not in 2000, and 
estimate the following regression equation: 
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1997-99)t*(Postal Saving)it-7 + νit    (3) 
 
If β1 is negative and significant, then it means that my instrument is strongly correlated with the 
endogenous regressor even in the absence of compelling mechanism that would induce such 
correlation. Such results would cast serious doubts on my proposition that that the observed 
negative correlation between the share of postal saving deposits in the early 1990s and the flow   12
of deposits from the postal saving system to private banks in the early 2000 is driven by the 
exogenous maturing of 10-year PSCs. To the contrary, however, the results suggest that the share 
of postal saving deposits in the early 1990s does not have any spurious predictive power for the 
shift in its value in the late 1990s (column 3).  
Second, I again drop the period of treatment from the data (2000-2004) while adding the 
data from the 1980s and check whether the share of postal saving deposits in the 1980s has any 
systematic relation with the differential flow of deposits 10 years later in the 1990s even before 
the treatment kicked in. That is, I apply fictitious treatment during 1991-1995, 1992-1996, 1993-
1997, 1994-1998, and 1995-1999 and estimate a series of regression equations: 
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1991-95)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (4) 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1992-96)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (5) 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1993-97)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (6) 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1994-98)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (7) 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 1995-99)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit    (8) 
 
Again, if β1 is negative and significant, then it undermines the validity of my instrument. The 
results, however, suggest that the share of postal saving deposits in the 1980s does not have any 
predictive power for the shift in this share in the 1990s (columns 4-8).  
Lastly, I again drop the period of treatment and check whether the share of postal saving 
deposits is spuriously negatively correlated with its future value during the preceding 15 years 
before the treatment; i.e., I estimate the following regression equation using the sample period 
from 1985 to 1999:   13
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1Postal Savingit-10 + νit    (9) 
 
The results suggest that there is not a statistical correlation between the share of postal saving 
deposits and its future value 10 years later prior to 2000 (column 9). In sum, these falsification 
exercises based on the historical data show that the share of postal saving deposits does not 
predict its future value or a change in its future value; it has such predictive power only after a 
decade long decline in interest rates in the early 2000.  
 
5. Distributional Effects 
A large theoretical literature in banking suggests that banks (partially) solve asymmetric 
information problems in credit markets by investing in the acquisition of borrower-specific 
information and/or closely monitoring borrowers (e.g., Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Diamond, 
1984, 1991). One of the empirical implications of this theory is that banks are important 
particularly for those borrowers that face severe information problems (e.g., Hubbard, Kuttner, 
and Palia (2002), Hadlock and James (2002), Ashcraft (2005), Khwaja and Mian 
(forthcoming)).
10 Therefore, if the observed statistical relationship between income and the 
(instrumented) flow of deposits from the postal saving system to private banks is indeed non-
mechanic, then the effects of postal saving deposits should have distributional consequence; i.e., 
an increase in the share of postal saving deposits hurt small firms more than large firms because 
                                                 
10 In a related literature, it has been shown that competition in banking sector has positive effects on real economy 
and, in particular, it fosters the entry and growth of small firms which depends on bank loans for external finance 
(e.g., Black and Strahan (2002), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Kerr 
and Nanda (2007), Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (forthcoming)).   14
small firms, on average, tend to have limited access to stock and bond markets, and thus relying 
mostly on local banks.  
To check if this is the case, I use the log of number of firms per capita, log of number of 
small firms (fewer than 30 employees) per capita, and log of number of large firms (300 
employees or more) per capita as the dependent variable in the second stage regression instead of 
the log of prefecture income per capita.
11 It must be noted that, while the data on prefecture 
income are available annually, the data on the number of firms are from Jigyousho Kigyou 
Toukei Chousa Houkoku (Enterprise Statistical Survey), and this survey was performed only in 
1996, 1999, 2001, and 2004, and thus the sample size declines dramatically from 470 to 188. 
  The results are reported in Table 2. The results of simple OLS with prefecture fixed 
effects and year fixed effects show that the coefficients on Postal Saving are not statistically 
significant (columns 1-3). Columns 4-6 show the results of instrumental variable estimates. 
These estimates suggest that the shift of funds from private banks to the postal saving system has 
negative effects on small firms, but not on large firms. Hence, these results are consistent with 
the story that the presence of a government-owned depository institution hurts small businesses 
as it takes away deposits from local private banks that small businesses rely on for external 
finance. Moreover, the observed negative correlation between local income and the share of 
postal saving deposits (Table 1) is unlikely to be spurious, given the differential effects of 
crowding-out on small versus large borrowers.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
                                                 
11 I follow the previous studies (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Kerr 
and Nanda (2007)), which use the cut-off size for small firms that range from 5 to 100 employees in classify small 
firms and large firms.   15
Instrumental variable methods generate inconsistent estimates if instruments are weakly 
correlated with a bad regressor in the first stage regression or correlated with error terms in the 
second stage regression. The first stage F-statistics seem to suggest that my instruments are 
reasonably strong (Stock and Yogo, 2005). However, the validity of instrument cannot be tested 
formally. In this section, I run two robustness checks to rule out some alternative stories that 
could potentially explain the negative correlation between real variables and the instrumented 
share of postal saving deposits.  
 
6.1. Pre-Existing Trend  
The simplest possible alternative explanation as to why the share of postal saving deposits has 
predictive power for its future value and income a decade later is the presence of prefecture 
specific trends that might have existed even before the treatment. Such trends might in turn 
depend on the initial conditions that are spuriously captured by my instrument. For instance, 
suppose that some prefectures started out relatively poor and thus more likely to be “un-banked” 
in my sample. If the Japanese government aggressively set up post offices to provide financial 
services to households in these relatively poor prefectures, then they are likely to have high 
initial postal saving deposits-to-total deposits ratio. If there is no reason to expect that economic 
growth is unrelated to past income, then my instrument, which is based on past postal saving 
deposits-to-total deposits ratio, is valid. The problem, however, is that it has been shown that 
local economies that start out with relatively low income have a strong tendency to grow more 
rapidly (e.g., Sala-i-Martin (1996)). 
  To address this concern, I include the “prefecture specific trend” in both the first stage 
and second stage regression equations, which accounts for a variation in growth rate of income   16
per capita that arises from unobserved initial economic conditions that might be correlated with 
my instrument, the initial share of postal saving deposits: 
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + δit + β1(Dummy for 2000-04)t*(Postal Saving)it-10 + νit   (10) 
Incomeit = γi + γt + φit + γ1Postal Savingit + εit       (11) 
 
If the pre-existing trend is driving the observed correlations between the share of postal saving 
deposits and its future shift a decade later, and between the (instrumented) share of postal saving 
deposits and local income, then the coefficient on Postal Saving in the second stage regression 
will decline toward zero and lose statistical significance once these differential growth patterns 
are controlled for. 
 
6.2. Differential Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks 
It is widely known that the Japanese economy was affected by a wave of macroeconomic shocks 
during the 1990s (Kuttner and Posen, 2001; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004). Hence, postal saving 
deposits as of the early 1990s can be spuriously correlated with economic conditions in the early 
2000 via differential sensitivity of local economies to common macroeconomic shocks. In 
particular, some prefectures might be more sensitive to monetary shocks simply because their 
investment schedule is more elastic to the cost of capital. According to this explanation, those 
prefectures with high postal saving deposits as of 1990 might be the ones in which local 
economies responded sensitively to adverse macroeconomic conditions. As interest rates 
declined over time, stimulating demand for credit, the share of postal saving deposits and local   17
income in these prefectures might have recovered relatively more rapidly than in other 
prefectures.  
  To address this concern, I allow the response of each prefecture to fluctuations in interest 
rate (on 10-year Japanese government bonds) and in aggregate income (Japan’s total Gross 
Domestic Product) to vary as follows: 
 
Postal Savingit = βi + βt + β1(Dummy for 2000-04)t*(Postal Saving)it-10  
+ ωiInterest Ratet + πiAggregate Incomet + νit         (12) 
Incomeit = γi + γt + γ1Postal Savingit + θiInterest Ratet + λiAggregate Incomet + εit   (13) 
 
Note that the coefficients on Interest Rate and Aggregate Income have subscript i, which allows 
different prefectures to respond differently to macroeconomic shocks. Again, if the share of 
postal saving deposits in the early 1990s, its shift in the early 2000, and local income are 
spuriously correlated via differential responses of each prefecture to macroeconomic shocks, the 
effects of the share of postal saving deposits should vanish once these differential responses to 
macroeconomic shocks are taken into account. 
 
6.3 Robustness Check Results 
The results of these robustness checks are reported in Table 3. The coefficients on the 
instrumental variable in the first stage remain statistically significant and qualitatively similar to 
the ones in the baseline specifications (Table 1). In addition, the first stage F-statistics remain 
large even with the inclusion of these various control variables (i.e., the instrument remains fairly 
strong). Although the coefficients on the share of postal saving deposits in the second stage   18
regression do indeed change from one specification to others, they remain statistically robust and 
quantitatively important. According to the most conservative estimate (column 4, Table 3), a 3 
percentage point increase in loans-to-total deposits ratio, a typical change within prefectures, 
leads to a 2.5 percent increase in local income. Overall, the results are robust to alternative 
specifications, and they are not driven by pre-existing trends or differential sensitivities of local 
economies to common macroeconomic shocks. 
In addition, I run the same robustness checks on the regression equations for the number 
of firms of various sizes (Table 4). In these robustness checks, one result turns out to be fragile. 
When I include the prefecture specific time trends, the F-statistic of the instrument declines 
dramatically and it dips below 10, which means that the instrument in this specification is weak 
and the results of the second stage regression might be seriously biased (columns 1 and 5). 
Otherwise, the results on the log of number of small firms are robust (columns 2-4), while the 
non-results on log of number of large firms are again robust (columns 6-8). In sum, these results 
suggest that the instrument is likely to be valid (although it might be weak), and that the postal 
saving system seems to adversely affect small firms as it takes away deposits from local banks 
that these firms depend on for external finance. 
 
6.4. Alternative Definitions of Small and Large Firms 
The definitions of small and large firms are somewhat arbitrary. In the main specification, I 
classify firms with fewer than 30 employees as small and those with 300 employees or more as 
large, classifications which can certainly be disputed. In fact, according to the Small and 
Medium Enterprise (SME) Basic Law in Japan, SMEs are defined as enterprises with 300 or 
fewer regular employees or with a capital stock of 300 million yen or less, which is much higher   19
than my “cut-off” size for the definition of small firms. Hence, I experiment with alternative 
classification scheme for small and large firms and see how the results change. As shown in 
Table 5, the results are robust even when I classify firms with 1-4 employees, 1-9 employees, or 
1-49 employees as small (columns 1-3).  The (non-)results are robust to alternative criterion for 
large firms (column 4, Table 5). 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
As a large number of 10-year fixed-rate Postal Saving Certificates (PSCs) that had been 
purchased during the period of high interest rates in the early 1990s began to mature in the early 
2000, the Japanese economy experienced a rapid outflow of funds from the government-
administered postal saving system. Through identifying this plausibly exogenous financial shock 
as a natural experiment, this paper investigates the crowding-out effects of a large government-
owned depository institution. Three notable results emerge. First, the share of local funds that 
had been deposited into the postal saving system in the early 1990s has strong explanatory power 
for the differential change in the share of postal saving deposits a decade later in the early 2000. 
Second, when appropriately instrumented, an increase in the share of postal saving deposits has 
economically important negative effects on the local income and the number of small firms, but 
not the number of large firms. These results support the hypothesis that the presence of large 
government-owned depository institutions has negative crowding-out effects on local economies, 
and in particular, on small local firms which rely on local banks that compete with government-
owned depository institutions for local deposits.  
  
   20
References 
Ashcraft, Adam B., 2005, Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced 
failure of healthy banks, American Economic Review 95, 1712-30. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, and Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad., 2007, Reaching Out: 
Access to and Use of Banking Services across Countries. Journal of Financial Economics 85, 
234-66. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2004, Bank competition and 
access to finance: international evidence, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36, 627-48. 
 
Becker, Bo, 2007, Geographical segmentation of US capital markets, Journal of Financial 
Economics 85, 151-78. 
 
Benfratello, Luigi, Fabio Schiantarelli, Alessandro Sembenelli, forthcoming, Banks and 
innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms. Journal of Financial Economics. 
 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004, How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-75. 
  
Black, Sandra E, and Philip E. Strahan, 2002, Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability, 
Journal of Finance 57, 2807-33. 
 
Cetorelli, Nicola, and Philip E. Strahan, 2006, Finance as a barrier to entry: Bank competition 
and industry structure in local U.S. markets, Journal of Finance 61, 437-61. 
 
Claessens, Stijn, 2006, Access to Financial Services: A Review of the Issues and Public Policy 
Objectives. World Bank Research Observer 21, 207-40. 
 
Cole, Shawn A. 2007. Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.  
 
Diamond, Douglas W., 1984, Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, Review of 
Economic Studies 51, 393-414. 
  
Diamond, Douglas W., 1991, Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and 
directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99, 689-721. 
 
Dinç, I Serdar. 2005. Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks 
in Emerging Markets. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 453-79. 
 
Doi, Takero, and Takeo Hoshi, 2003, Paying for the FILP, in Magnus Blomstrom, et al., eds.: 
Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan (University of Chicago Press) 
    21
Hadlock, Charles J., and Christopher M. James, 2002, Do banks provide financial slack? Journal 
of Finance 57, 1383-1419 
 
Hoshi, Takeo; Kashyap, Anil K. 2004. Japan's Financial Crisis and Economic Stagnation. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3-26. 
 
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Kenneth N. Kuttner, Darius N. Palia, 2002, Are there bank effects in 
borrowers' costs of funds? Evidence from a matched sample of borrowers and banks, Journal of 
Business 75, 559-81. 
 
Imai, Masami, forthcoming, Political determinants of government loans in Japan, Journal of Law 
and Economics. 
 
Imai, Masami, forthcoming, Ideologies, vested interested groups, and postal saving privatization 
in Japan, Public Choice 
 
Jayaratne, Jith, and Philip E. Strahan, 1996, The finance-growth nexus: Evidence from bank 
branch deregulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639-70. 
 
Kerr, William, and Ramana Nanda, 2007, Democratizing entry: banking deregulations, financing 
constraints, and entrepreneurship, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau, Working 
Papers. 
 
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz; Mian, Atif. 2005. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent 
Provision in an Emerging Financial Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411.  
 
Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, and Atif Mian, forthcoming, Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks: 
evidence from an emerging market, American Economic Review. 
 
King, Robert G; Levine, Ross. 1993. Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-37. 
 
Kuttner, Kenneth N; Posen, Adam S. 2001. The Great Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic 
Policy from Japan. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0, 93-160. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, 2002. Government Ownership 
of Banks. Journal of Finance 57, 265-301. 
 
Guiso, Luigi; Sapienza, Paola; Zingales, Luigi. 2004. Does Local Financial Development 
Matter? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-69. 
 
Micco, Alejandro, Panizza, Ugo, Yanez, Monica, 2007, Bank Ownership and Performance. Does 
Politics Matter? Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 219-41. 
 
O'Hara, Maureen, and David Easley, 1979, The postal savings system in the Depression, Journal 
of Economic History, 39, 741-53.   22
 
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm's-
length debt, Journal of Finance 47, 1367-400. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi. 1998, Financial Dependence and Growth. American 
Economic Review 88, 559-86. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier X., 1996, The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis. Economic 
Journal 106, 1019-36. 
 
Sapienza, Paola. 2004. The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending. Journal of 
Financial Economics 72, 357-84. 
 
Schaffer, M.E., 2007,  xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and 
AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models. 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html 
 
Sharpe, Steven A., 1990, Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A 
stylized model of customer relationships, Journal of Finance 45, 1069-87. 
 
Schmukler, Sergio L; Gozzi, Juan Carlos; de la Torre, Augusto, 2007, Innovative experiences in 
access to finance: market friendly roles for the visible hand? The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series: 4326. 
 
Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo, 2005, Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression, 
in Donald W.K. Andrews and Stock, James H., eds.:  Identification and Inference for 
Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg (Cambridge University Press) 
  
World Bank. 2008. Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank.   23
Appendix 
Cross-Sectional Approach 
We start with a system of two equations that determine the share of postal saving deposits and 
local income:  
it it t i it
it it t t i it
PS Y
PS D PS
ε γ γ γ
ν β β β
+ + + =
+ + + = −
1
10 1  
where the variables are abbreviated to conserve space; i.e., PS is the share of postal saving 
deposits, D is “Dummy for 2000-04”, and Y is the outcome variable of interest (the log of income 
per capita, log of total firms per capita, log of small firms per capita, or log of large firms per 
capita).  We can eliminate prefecture fixed effects βi by defining the amount of change in PS 
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Similarly, we can define the amount of change in Y from the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
to eliminate prefecture fixed effects γi as follows: 
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Hence, the parameter of interest γ1 can be estimated by simply estimating cross-sectional 
regression of change in a outcome variable (ΔY) from the late 1990s to the early 2000 on change 
in the share of postal saving deposits (ΔPS) during the same period while instrumenting ΔPS 
with the share of postal saving deposits in the early 1990s. Note that the virtue of this approach is 
its simplicity as well as the fact that the statistical significance of the results will not be affected 
by possible serial correlation of error term. A drawback is that it does not make use of variation 
in the share of postal saving deposits within prefecture during the early 2000. The results based 
on the cross sectional approach are given in Table A1, and they are qualitatively comparable to 
the panel data results.   25
Table A1: Results of Transformed Cross-Sectional Regression 
The dependent variable is the change in postal saving deposits-to-total deposits ratio in the first stage regression and 
the change in the log of prefecture income per capita (column 1), change in the log of firms per capita (column 2), 
change in the log of small firms per capita (column 3), change in the log of large firms per capita (column 4) from 
the late 1990s to the early 2000s in the second stage regression. The data cover Japan’s 47 prefectures. The 
regression equations are estimated with Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 with robust and cluster 
options is used.  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  First Stage Regression 
Variables        
Initial Postal Saving Share  -0.116***  -0.116***  -0.116***  -0.116*** 
(as of the early 1990s)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0255)  (0.0255) 
Constant 0.00124  0.00124  0.00124  0.00124 
 (0.00815)  (0.00815)  (0.00815)  (0.00815) 
Observations 47  47  47  47 
R-squared 0.196  0.196  0.196  0.196 
First Stage F Statistic  20.44  20.44  20.44  20.44 
P-value of First Stage F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
        
        
 Second  Stage  Regression 
 ln(Income)  ln(Firms)  ln(Small Firms)  ln(Large Firms) 
        
Change in Postal Saving Deposit Share  -1.074**  -1.693***  -1.778***  -0.0843 
(from the late 1990s to the early 2000s) (0.493)  (0.601) (0.628)  (2.116) 
Constant -0.0543***  -0.126***  -0.131***  -0.0109 
 (0.0184)  (0.0214)  (0.0224)  (0.0760) 
Observations 47  47  47  47 
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Table A.2: Data Source and Description  
Variables Description  Data  Source 
Prefecture Income  Log of Gross Prefecture Product per capita  Kenmin Keizai Keisan Nenpo (Annual Report on 
Economics Statistics in Prefecture) 
Postal Saving  Ratio of postal saving deposits to total deposits   Kinyu Keizai Tokei Geppou (Reports on Finance and 
Economy) 
Postal Saving, t-10  Ratio of postal saving deposits to total deposits (lagged 10 
years) 
Same as above 
Dummy for 2000-04  Dummy variable ( = 1 if year = 2000-2004)  Author’s calculation 
ln(Firms)  Log of number of firms  Jigyousho Kigyou Toukei Chousa Houkoku (Enterprise 
Statistical Survey) 
ln(Small Firms), (1-29 employees)  Log of number of small firms (1-29 employees)  Same as above 
ln(Large Firms), (300 employees or more)  Log of number of large firms (300 employees or more)  Same as above   27
Table A.3: Summary Statistics 
  mean Standard  Deviation  Minimum Maximum
   Overall  Between  Within     
Prefecture Income  1.27092 0.164181 0.164047  0.023774  0.943397 1.992875 
Postal Saving  0.370798 0.066549 0.060713 0.02852  0.132717  0.548002 
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Postal Saving, t-10)  0.173226 0.165376 0.031692 0.162371  0  0.498513 
ln(Firms)  -3.00763 0.139707 0.132914  0.046211  -3.47583  -2.73307 
ln(Small Firms)  -3.05339 0.142627 0.135591  0.047462  -3.53255  -2.77173 
ln(Large Firms)  -9.78534 0.363485 0.360811  0.063447  -10.6288  -8.57327 
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Table 1: Postal Saving Deposits and Prefecture Income 
The dependent variables are postal saving deposits-to-total deposits ratio in the first stage and log of prefecture income per capita in the second stage. The data cover 
Japan’s 47 prefectures from 1995 to 2004 except for falsification exercise (columns 3-9) which cover the period from 1985 up to 1999. The regression equations include 
fixed prefecture effects and fixed year effects, and are estimated with Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and robust to heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 with robust and cluster options is used.  
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 OLS  IV  IV 
   1st Stage  1st Stage 
Variables   Main Results  Falsification Exercises 
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)    -0.125***         
   (0.0260)         
(Dummy for 1997-1999)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-7)      0 . 0 1 3 6         
     (0.0250)        
(Dummy for 1995-1999)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)        0.0257       
       (0.0401)       
(Dummy for 1994-1998)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)         0.0281      
        (0.0383)      
(Dummy for 1993-1997)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)          0.0229     
         (0.0371)     
(Dummy for 1992-1996)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)           0.00547    
          (0.0357)    
(Dummy for 1991-1995)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)            - 0 . 0 2 4 9    
           (0.0331)   
Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10             - 0 . 0 8 5 4  
            ( 0 . 1 0 8 )  
R-squared   0.864  0.863 0.940 0.942 0.935 0.923 0.893 0.919 
   23.25  0.29 1.85 2.40 1.80 0.12 2.67 0.62 
   0.000  0.590 0.175 0.122 0.180 0.729 0.103 0.433 
            
 OLS  2nd Stage  2nd Stage 
Share of Postal Saving Deposits  -0.306**  -1.007**  2.528 6.396 6.147 6.407 24.64 -4.650  -9.108 
 (0.130)  (0.442)  (8.106) (5.182) (4.413) (5.300) (71.60) (3.015) (11.38) 
R-squared 0.415           
Observations 470  470  235 470 470 470 470 470 705 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   29
Table 2: Postal Saving Deposits and Firm Creation 
The data cover Japan’s 47 prefectures in 1996, 1999, 2001, and 2004. The regression equations include fixed prefecture effects and fixed year effects, and are estimated 
with Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 
with robust and cluster options is used.  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
  OLS  IV (First Stage Regression) 
Variables          
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Share of Postal Saving Deposits, t-10)        -0.158***  -0.158***  -0.158*** 
       (0.0308)  (0.0308)  (0.0308) 
R-squared       0.892  0.892  0.892 
First Stage F Statistic        26.35  26.35  26.35 
P-value of First Stage F        0.000  0.000  0.000 
          
  OLS  IV (Second Stage Regression) 
  ln(Firms)  ln(Small Firms)  ln(Large Firms)  ln(Firms)  ln(Small Firms)  ln(Large Firms) 
Share of Postal Saving Deposits  0.0202  0.0187  0.0521  -1.174***  -1.234***  -0.0319 
  (0.101) (0.107)  (0.555) (0.403) (0.420)  (1.535) 
Observations  188 188  188 188 188  188 
R-squared 0.928  0.926  0.134       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   30
Table 3: Robustness Checks (Prefecture Specific Time Trend and Differential Effects of Common Macroeconomic Shocks) 
The dependent variables are postal saving deposits-to-total deposits ratio in the first stage and log of prefecture income per capita in the second stage. The data cover 
Japan’s 47 prefectures from 1995 to 2004. The regression equations include fixed prefecture effects and fixed year effects, and are estimated with Two Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 with robust and cluster 
options is used.  In these robustness checks, prefecture specific time trend are included to account for pre-existing trend (column 1). In addition, each prefecture is allowed 
to exhibit different sensitivity to fluctuations in interest rates and aggregate output (columns 2-4).  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  First Stage Regression 
Variables        
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Postal Saving, t-10)  -0.0852***  -0.135***  -0.114***  -0.123*** 
 (0.0274)  (0.0252)  (0.0259)  (0.0235) 
R-squared 0.025  0.108  0.065  0.078 
First Stage F Statistic  9.68  28.91  19.42  27.45 
P-value of First Stage F  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  Second Stage Regression 
Share of Postal Saving Deposits  -1.515**  -0.860***  -1.000*  -0.841** 
 (0.661)  (0.320)  (0.538)  (0.417) 
Prefecture Specific Time Trend  Yes  No  No  No 
Differential Effects of Interest Rates  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Differential Effects of Aggregate Output  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations 470  470  470  470 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Robustness Checks on Firm Results 
The data cover Japan’s 47 prefectures in 1996, 1999, 2001, and 2004. The regression equations include fixed prefecture effects and fixed year effects, and are estimated 
with Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 
with robust and cluster options is used.  In these robustness checks, prefecture specific time trend are included to account for pre-existing trend (columns 1 and 5). In 
addition, each prefecture is allowed to exhibit different sensitivity to fluctuations in interest rates and aggregate output (columns 2-4 and 6-8). 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  First Stage Regression 
Variables  ln(Small Firms)  ln(Large Firms) 
(Dummy for 2000-04)*(Postal Saving, t-10)  -0.107**  -0.200*** -0.238***  -0.224*** -0.107**  -0.200*** -0.238*** -0.224*** 
  (0.0460)  (0.0496) (0.0582) (0.0639) (0.0460) (0.0496) (0.0582) (0.0639) 
R-squared  0.044  0.137 0.171 0.210 0.044 0.137 0.171 0.210 
First Stage F Statistic  5.39  16.22  16.76  12.27  5.39  16.22  16.76  12.27 
P-value of First Stage F  0.025  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.025  0.000  0.000  0.001 
LABELS  IV  IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
  Second Stage Regression 
  ln(Small Firms)  ln(Large Firms) 
Share of Postal Saving Deposits  -0.394  -0.629*** -0.802***  -0.792*** -0.560  -0.655  -0.513  -0.846 
  (0.377)  (0.231) (0.292) (0.266) (3.075) (1.219) (1.109) (1.158) 
Prefecture Specific Time Trend  Yes  No  No  No  Yes No  No  No 
Differential Effects of Interest Rates  No  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Differential Effects of Aggregate Output  No  No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations  188  188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   32
Table 5: Results Based on Alternative Definitions of Small Firms and Large Firms 
The data cover Japan’s 47 prefectures in 1996, 1999, 2001, and 2004. The regression equations include fixed prefecture effects and fixed year effects, and are estimated 
with Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). Standard errors are in parenthesis and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within each prefecture. Stata’s xtivreg2 
with robust and cluster options is used. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







(100 employees or more) 
Share of Postal Saving Deposits  -1.051*** -1.252*** -1.215***  0.662 
  (0.404) (0.441) (0.413) (0.749) 
Observations  188 188 188 188 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  33
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